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policy different from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal that increases 
with the size of the discrepancy. With partially binding platforms, the median-voter 
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equilibrium. If and only if the cost of betrayal goes to infinity for any degree of 
betrayal, the median-voter theorem holds. Partially binding platforms also can 
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whose cost of betrayal is higher than the opposition with the same degree of 
betrayal wins. The degree of honesty can be derived endogenously, and candidates 
who have the above characteristics are more honest.   
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There are two important questions for political competition: ￿what policies do candidates
adopt?￿and ￿which candidate wins?￿To my knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to show that
campaign platforms are an important factor in answering these questions.1 Most past studies
introduce two polar assumptions about platforms. First, electoral-competition models in
the Downsian tradition suppose that a politician cannot implement any policy other than
the platform, and I call such models completely binding platforms.2 Such models show
quite unrealistic outcomes of elections, that is, the median-voter theorem. In equilibrium,
both candidates will implement the median policy, and the outcome of elections is always a
tie.3 There is another assumption regarding campaign platforms. Models with nonbinding
platforms assume that a politician can implement any policy freely with no cost.4 Such
models can show the divergence of policies and predict which candidate wins, but candidates￿
implemented policies are given exogenously as their ideal policies, and obviously a candidate
whose ideal policy is closer to the median policy wins. On the other hand, this paper
examines the e⁄ects of campaign platforms in political competition when campaign platforms
are partially binding: a candidate who implements a policy di⁄erent from his/her platform
must pay a ￿cost of betrayal.￿
Politicians may betray their platform severely, a little or not at all depending on elections
in the real world, and if the winner betrays his platform, such betrayal should be costly.
When politicians implement a di⁄erent policy to their platforms, the people and the media
criticize the politicians5, and their approval rating may fall. As a result, it becomes di¢ cult to
manage the government. In order to betray the platform, a politician needs to negotiate with
1I also study partially binding platforms as in Asako (2009).
2Models based on Downs (1957) and Wittman (1973). See Roemer (2001).
3When policy-motivated candidates have uncertainty about voters￿preferences, a divergence of policies
appear (Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985)), and one candidate may have a higher probability of winning
than the opposition if candidate￿ s policies are not equidistance from the median policy. In a citizen candidate
model, one candidate also may have a higher probability of winning than the others when there are three or
more candidates. On the other hand, my paper considers a politican competition with two candidates and
without any uncertainty, but shows such results.
4For example, this approach is taken in citizen-candidate models (Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne
and Slivinski (1996)) and retrospective voting models (Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986)).
5Some papers show the relationship between the media and the credible commitment of politicians.
Reinikka and Svensson (2005) study newspaper campaigns in Uganda, and show that such campaigns reduces
corruption. Djankov et al. (2003) show empirically that policy making is distorted if the media is owned by
the government.
2the Congress, and if there are many legislators of the opposition party in the Congress, the
negotiation cost should be quite high. The party should also be able to discipline politicians
in order to keep their platform.6 Moreover, the possibility of losing the next election may
increase. Therefore, there should exist a cost of betrayal. For example, in his campaign,
Bill Clinton promised to ￿end welfare as we know it,￿i.e., he promised welfare reform, and
became president in 1992. In the 1994 midterm election, the Republican Party won; it made
it more di¢ cult to negotiate with the Congress, and the Congress pressured Clinton to keep
his promise, and he signed the welfare reform bill in 1996 (Weaver (2000) Ch. 5). On the
other hand, in 1988, George H. W. Bush promised ￿read my lips, no new taxes,￿but he
increased taxes after he became president. The media and voters visibly noted this betrayal,
and he lost in the 1992 presidential election (Campbell (2008) p. 104). Politicians decide
policy based on their platforms and the cost of betrayal, so actual campaign platforms should
be a partial commitment device, and not full commitment devices in models of completely
binding platforms or no commitment in models of nonbinding platforms.7
I build a model with partially binding platforms that supposes that a candidate can
choose any policy, but bears costs depending on the degree of betrayal. My model is based
on the Downs￿ Wittman tradition with fully policy-motivated candidates. Two candidates
compete in unidimensional policy space. One candidate prefers to implement a policy to
the left of the median policy, and the other candidate prefers to implement a policy to
the right. Before an election, candidates announce their platforms. Based on the cost of
betrayal and the platform, the winner decides the implemented policy after the election.
Thus, the implemented policy will be between the platform and the ideal policy because of
the cost of betrayal as Figure 1 shows. This paper provides three new contributions from
the introduction of partially binding platforms.
The ￿rst contribution is that the median-voter theorem does not hold with partially
binding platforms. The median-voter theorem means that two candidates will implement the
same policy, so that voters and candidates do not care who wins because they are indi⁄erent
between candidates￿policies. However, if platforms are partially binding, candidates also
6Cox and McCubbins (1994) and Aldrich (1997) show this point from the historical aspects of the US
parties. Snyder and Groseclose (2000) and McCarty et al. (2001) show empirically that there are various
party disciplines in the US Congress. McGillivray (1997) compares high and low disciplines in trade policies.
Grossman and Helpman (2005, 2008) suppose that there is a punishment from the party if the legislator
betrays the party￿ s platform.
7Persson and Tabellini (2000) also indicate, ￿(i)t is thus somewhat schizophrenic to study either extreme:
where platforms have no meaning or where they are all that matter. To bridge the two models is an important
challenge (p. 483).￿
3care about the cost of betrayal, so they have an incentive to lose when the divergence of
policies is very small. If the cost of betrayal approaches in￿nity for any degree of betrayal,
the degree of betrayal of the winner goes to zero, so the median-voter theorem holds, i.e.,
the outcome becomes the same as models with completely binding platforms. If the cost of
betrayal is reduced to zero for any degree of betrayal, the implemented policy converges to
the ideal policy such as in models with nonbinding platforms. Therefore, complete binding
and nonbinding platforms are extreme cases of partially binding platforms.
The second contribution is that the model of partially binding platforms can predict which
candidate wins when candidates are asymmetric, that is, have di⁄erent characteristics. In
real elections, candidates are usually asymmetric. For example, their ideal policies are
not equidistant from the median policy. One candidate cares about policy more than the
opposition, that is, more policy motivated. The cost of betrayal may also be di⁄erent among
candidates. More senior politicians may not care about future elections or a party￿ s discipline
compared with young politicians, or if the media supports one candidate, this candidate￿ s
betrayal may not be announced to the public, in which case the cost of betrayal should
be low for such candidates. In models of completely binding platforms, both candidates
commit to the median policy even though candidates are asymmetric when there is not any
uncertainty about voters￿preference. On the other hand, in the model of partially binding
platforms, because of the cost of betrayal, candidates may not have large incentives to win.
If candidates￿characteristics di⁄er, one candidate may always have a higher incentive to win
and a higher probability of winning.
This paper analyzes three cases in which the probability of winning is asymmetric. First,
the moderate candidate whose ideal policy is closer to the median policy wins against a
more extreme candidate. A more moderate candidate always has a higher incentive to win
than an extreme candidate because it is easy to commit to a more moderate policy with
the lower cost of betrayal. In models of nonbinding platforms, a more moderate candidate
wins too, but candidates cannot commit to any policy so the winner is decided exogenously.
On the other hand, in my model, an extreme candidate can win against a moderate one,
but an extreme candidate chooses to lose in equilibrium. Second, one candidate￿ s cost of
betrayal may be higher than the opposition when the degree of betrayal is the same for both
candidates. Higher costs of betrayal with the same degree of betrayal do not mean higher costs
of betrayal in equilibrium. If the cost is higher with the same degree of betrayal, a candidate
will not betray his/her platform so severely, so the realized cost of betrayal becomes lower,
and such a candidate can commit a more moderate policy with a lower cost. As a result, if
4a candidate￿ s cost of betrayal is higher than the opposition when the degree of betrayal is
the same for both candidates, this candidate wins. Third, a less policy-motivated candidate
wins against a more policy-motivated one. If a candidate is more policy motivated, he/she
will betray the platform more severely, so the cost of betrayal is also higher.
The ￿nal contribution is that the model of partially binding platforms can derive ￿va-
lence,￿in particular the degree of honesty endogenously. Several past studies consider the
e⁄ects of a candidate￿ s character or personality as indicated by Stokes (1963) as valence
including the degree of honesty, and they also show an asymmetric probability of winning
in a political competition. These past studies assume that the valence of a candidate is
decided exogenously, and voters care not only about the policy but also valence8, there-
fore such an advantaged candidate with valence has a higher probability of winning in an
election.9 On the other hand, my paper derives a candidate￿ s degree of honesty (and the
winner) endogenously. I de￿ne that candidates are more honest when candidates￿platforms
are closer to their ideal policies, they do not betray the platform so severely, and the winner￿ s
implemented policy is more moderate. Three cases are also shown. First, more moderate
candidates are more honest, and more extreme candidates are more disingenuous. More
extreme candidates will implement more extreme policy because they will have a higher
cost of betrayal and a disutility from policy following a win. However, they also know that
they will betray very severely, therefore they need to announce platforms that are very far
from the candidate￿ s ideal policy. Second, if the candidates￿costs of betrayal are higher for
any degree of betrayal, these candidates are also more honest. Third, less policy-motivated
candidates are more honest. The situation is similar to the second contribution, therefore it
can be concluded that the more honest candidate wins in a political election.
While some papers mainly analyze the signaling aspect of campaign platforms10, few
8For example, in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (2001), Kartik
and McAfee (2007) and Callander (2007), there are advantaged and disadvantaged candidates. An advantage
is given exogenously as a valence, and a voter￿ s utility is a⁄ected by not only a policy but also by such a
valence.
9In Kartik and McAfee (2006), the situation is possibly the reverse. However, they assume that the
candidate with valence does not behave strategically.
10For example, Harrington (1992), Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) assume that the platform
is a signal about the implemented policy. Some other papers assume a completely binding platform to be
a signal about something other than implemented policies, such as the functioning of the economy (Schulz,
1996), the candidate￿ s political motivation (Callander, 2007) or the candidate￿ s degree of honesty (Kartik and
McAfee, 2007). This paper considers only the complete-information case, and an incomplete-information
case is analyzed in Asako (2009). Additionally, Harrington (1992) and Aragones et al. (2002) show that, in
a repeated game, nonbinding platforms can be completely binding in equilibrium.
5papers consider platforms as a partial commitment device. Austen-Smith and Banks (1989)
consider a two-period game based on a retrospective voting model in which if o¢ ce-motivated
candidates betray the platform, the probability of winning in the next election decreases.
Grossman and Helpman (2005, 2008) develop a legislative model in which o¢ ce-motivated
parties announce platforms before an election, and the victorious legislators who are policy
motivated decide policy. If legislators betray the party platform, the party punishes them.
On the other hand, my model is based on the prospective and two-candidate competition
model, and assumes that candidates who are policy-motivated decide on both a platform
and a policy. Additionally, Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) consider only a decrease in
the probability of winning as a cost of betrayal, and Grossman and Helpman (2005, 2008)
consider only a party￿ s discipline as a cost of betrayal. However, as I indicated, the cost
of betrayal also includes many types of costs such as a decrease of approval ratings or the
negotiation cost with the Congress, therefore I include them in the current term as the cost
of betrayal. Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) consider a similar idea as the
cost of betrayal. They consider nonbinding platforms, and, because there is a ￿cost to lie,￿
which is born after an election, a candidate does not want to announce a platform that is
far from his/her ideal policy. In their papers, candidates implement their own ideal policies
automatically, but if there is such a cost, a rational candidate should want to adjust the
implemented policy rather than automatically implementing the ideal policy to reduce the
cost. A politician￿ s decision after the election should also be rational, so I examine rational
choices on both platforms and policy.
Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 shows a political equilibrium with symmet-
ric candidates and the endogenous degree of honesty. Section 4 examines who wins among
asymmetric candidates and discusses the political motivations of candidates. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Setting
The policy space is <. There is a continuum of voters with ideal policies in <. Their ideal
policies are distributed on some interval of <, and the distribution function is continuous
and strictly increasing, therefore there is a unique median voter￿ s ideal policy, xm. There are
two candidates, L and R. Denote xi as the ideal policy where i = L;R, and xL < xm < xR.
At the ￿rst period, each candidate announces a platform, denoted by zi 2 < where i = L
or R. Based on their platforms, voters decide on a winner according to a majority voting
6rule. In the last period, the winning candidate decides the implemented policy, denoted by
￿i where i = L or R.
If the implemented policy is di⁄erent from the candidate￿ s ideal policy, the candidate
experiences a disutility. This disutility is represented by ￿v(j￿￿xij) where i = L or R, and
￿ is the policy implemented by the winner. Assume that v(:) satis￿es v(0) = 0, v0(0) = 0,
v0(d) > 0 and v00(d) ￿ 0 when d > 0. If the implemented policy is not the same as the
platform, the winning candidate needs to pay some costs. The function describing the cost of
betrayal is ￿c(jzi￿￿ij). Assume that c(:) satis￿es c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0, c0(d) > 0 and c00(d) > 0
when d > 0. The parameter, ￿ > 0, represents the relative importance of betrayal. In the
last period, the winning candidate chooses a policy that maximizes ￿v(j￿￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿j).
Denote ￿i(zi) = argmax￿ ￿ v(j￿ ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿j).
Upon observing zi, the utility of voter n when candidate i wins is ￿u(j￿i(zi) ￿ xnj).
Assume that u(:) satis￿es u0(j￿i(zi) ￿ xnj) > 0 when j￿i(zi) ￿ xnj > 0.
Let Fi(zi) denote the distribution function of the mixed strategy chosen by i. Denote
￿i(zi;zj) as the probability of winning of candidate i given zi and zj. The expected utility











(1 ￿ ￿i(zi;zj))v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij)dFj(zj); (1)
where i;j = L;R. In summary, the timing of events and a political equilibrium are as follows.
I show the de￿nition including a mixed strategy, but I will show that there is no equilibrium
with a mixed strategy.
1. The candidates announce their platforms.
2. Voters vote.
3. The winning candidate chooses which policy to implement.
De￿nition 1 A political equilibrium is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the game
played by two candidates. A political equilibrium has a distribution function Fi(:) and the
implemented policy ￿i(zi) for i = L;R such that:
￿ For all zi in the support of Fi(zi), Vi(zi;Fj(zj)) ￿ Vi(z0
i;Fj(zj)) 8z0
i 2 <.
￿ ￿i(zi) = argmax￿ ￿ v(j￿ ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿j).
73 Symmetric Candidates
First, symmetric candidates are analyzed. Symmetric candidates mean that the forms of
cost and disutility functions are the same for both candidates, and their ideal policies are
equidistant from the median policy.
3.1 An Implemented Policy
In the last period, the winning candidate implements the policy that maximizes the utility
after a win, ￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) given zi.





If ￿ goes to in￿nity, ￿i(zi) converges to zi. If ￿ goes to zero, ￿i(zi) converges to xi.
It is straightforward from the ￿rst-order condition, and the implemented policy will be
between the platform and the ideal policy as Figure 1 shows using R as an example. When
￿ increases, the winning candidate￿ s implemented policy approaches the platform. When ￿
decreases, the winning candidate￿ s implemented policy approaches the ideal policy. When
v00(d) = 0 for all d ￿ 0, the above proposition becomes the following corollary.
Corollary 1 When v00(d) = 0 for all d ￿ 0, ￿i(zi) satis￿es ￿ ￿
v0(j￿i(zi)￿xij)
c0(jzi￿￿i(zi)j). If ￿ is
su¢ ciently low, ￿i(zi) = xi = zi, and ￿ <
v0(j￿i(zi)￿xij)
c0(jzi￿￿i(zi)j).
When v00(d) = 0 for all d ￿ 0, v0(j￿i(zi)￿xij) is a constant value, therefore ￿i(zi) depends
not only on the platform, but also the ideal policy. When ￿ is low, ￿i(zi), which satis￿es (2),
may be more extreme than the ideal policy because jzi ￿￿i(zi)j goes to in￿nity when ￿ goes
to zero. In this case, the winner prefers to implement xi instead of ￿i(zi), which satis￿es (2),
therefore ￿i(zi) = xi = zi.
3.2 Platforms
The Condorcet winner is the median policy, therefore if the candidate￿ s implemented policy
approaches the median policy more than the opposition￿ s does, this candidate is certain to
win. The next lemma shows that the implemented policy does not take any value that is
more extreme than the ideal policy, and it is not further from the candidate￿ s ideal policy
than the median policy.
8Lemma 2 In a political equilibrium, the pair of platforms, fzR;zLg, satis￿es xL ￿ ￿L(zL) ￿
xm ￿ ￿R(zR) ￿ xR.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
When the candidate i wins, the utility of i is ￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j). When
the opposition j wins, the utility of i is ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij). In equilibrium, these two utilities
must be same.
Proposition 1 Suppose v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. The pair of platforms, fzL; zRg, is a
political equilibrium if and only if:
￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) = ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij); (3)
for i;j = L;R and i 6= j. A political equilibrium exists, and it is symmetric and unique.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
The main idea of the proof is as follows. When two candidates tie, if ￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿
￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) > ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij), the candidate prefers to be certain to win because the
utility when the candidate wins is higher than the utility when the opposition wins. If the
candidate approaches xm, this candidate is certain to win, therefore the candidate deviates
in this way. If ￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) < ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij), the candidate does
not want to win because he/she prefers that the opposition wins. The candidate deviates
to move away from xm and is certain to lose. Note that if a candidate￿ s implemented policy
approaches the median policy, the cost of betrayal and the disutility after a win increases
when v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. A political equilibrium is unique, therefore there does not
exist any mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Models of completely binding platforms have the restriction that the platform and im-
plemented policy must be same, zi = ￿i(zi). There is not any cost of betrayal, so a political
equilibrium should satisfy ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij) = ￿v(j￿j(zj)￿xij), and, if and only if ￿i(zi) = xm,
is it satis￿ed. On the other hand, with partially binding platforms, zi 6= ￿i(zi), if there exists
a term for the cost of betrayal, ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j), therefore ￿i(zi) and ￿j(zj) should diverge
to satisfy (3). Models of nonbinding platforms have the restriction that the implemented
policy and ideal policy must be same, therefore candidates cannot commit to any policy to
be implemented other than ideal policies.
If the disutility function, v(:), is linear, the situation may change. As Corollary 1 in-
dicated, an implemented policy will depend on only the platform. When xR ￿ xL is quite
9small, a candidate does not mind if the opposition wins because the opposition￿ s ideal policy
is similar to its own ideal policy, and the cost of betrayal is high if it commits any policy
other than his/her ideal policy. Therefore, the candidates may prefer to stay with their ideal
policies. Denote zi(xi) = ￿
￿1
i (xi) as a platform that commits the candidate to implement
xi, and this platform di⁄ers from xi.
Corollary 2 Suppose v00(d) = 0 for all d > 0. If 1
2v(xR ￿ xL) < ￿c(jxi ￿ zi(xi)j), the
candidates choose the ideal policy as their platform and the implemented policy, that is,
zi = xi = ￿(zi). If not, Proposition 1 holds.
The condition, 1
2v(xR￿xL) < ￿c(jxi￿zi(xi)j), means that the candidate has no incentive
to deviate to be certain to win when the candidate chooses zi = xi = ￿i(xi). When a
candidate chooses zi = xi, the expected utility is ￿1
2v(xR ￿ xL) because v(xi ￿ xi) = 0 and
v(:) is linear. When the candidate commits a policy that is slightly lower than his/her ideal
policy and wins, the expected utility is slightly lower than ￿￿c(jxi ￿ zi(xi)j). As a result,
when ￿1
2v(xR ￿ xL) > ￿￿c(jxi ￿ zi(xi)j), candidates do not want to deviate from zi = xi.
3.3 Comparative Statics and the Endogenous Degree of Honesty









does not decrease as d decreases.
These assumptions mean that the relative marginal cost and disutility decrease as jzi￿￿ij
(jxi ￿ ￿ij) increases. For example, if the function is monomial such as quadratic, these as-
sumptions hold, and many polynomial functions satisfy them. Therefore, these assumptions
are quite weak ones.
3.3.1 Cost of Betrayal
This subsection shows the comparative statics of the relative importance of betrayal, ￿. In
order to commit the same implemented policy, a candidate needs to pay a larger cost of
betrayal when ￿ decreases.
10Proposition 2 Consider Assumption 1. The cost of betrayal (￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j)) decreases
as ￿ increases given the implemented policy. The cost of betrayal goes to zero as ￿ goes to
in￿nity, and the candidates￿implemented policies and platforms converge to xm.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
When ￿ increases, a candidate does not want to betray the platform, therefore jzi￿￿i(zi)j
and c(jzi ￿￿i(zi)j) decrease, and the decrease in c(jzi ￿￿i(zi)j) is faster than the increase in
￿. As a result, ￿c(jzi ￿￿i(zi)j) decreases as ￿ increases. When ￿c(jzi ￿￿i(zi)j) goes to zero,
condition (3) becomes ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij) = ￿v(j￿j(zj)￿xij), and it holds if and only if ￿i(zi) =
￿j(zj) = xm in equilibrium. Therefore, if ￿ reaches in￿nity, the median-voter theorem holds
as in completely binding platforms. When ￿ < 1, they prefer to diverge. When ￿ goes to
zero, the implemented policy converges to the ideal policy.11 Therefore, completely binding
and nonbinding platforms are extreme cases of partially binding platforms.
The value of ￿ is decided by many factors. For example, when the freedom of the press
is not su¢ cient, ￿ is low because the media will not report politicians￿betrayals. When a
large special interest group supports politicians, politicians are assured a large number of
votes in an election and the probability of losing in the next election is quite low, therefore
the candidate does not care about the cost of betrayal. If the power of a party or Congress
is not very strong, ￿ is low because the discipline from them is not very strong.
In other words, ￿ measures the level of a democracy￿ s maturity. Some political scien-
tists and economists indicate that politicians in mature democracies have a greater ability
to make binding platforms. For example, in immature democracies, politicians have strong
relationships with speci￿c groups of voters.12 If the democracy is mature, it has freedom
of the press and government transparency, and strong parties monitor the politicians, who
therefore do not betray their platforms as often.13 Thus, the value of ￿ is higher in mature
democracies and lower in immature democracies. Indeed, using cross-country data, Keefer
(2007) shows the di⁄erences between younger and older democracies, and that these di⁄er-
ences arise from the inability to make credible platforms to voters in younger democracies.
According to my model, when the maturity of a democracy increases, the implemented poli-
11If v(:) is linear, and ￿ is su¢ ciently low, then a candidate promises the ideal policy as a platform from
Corollary 2.
12Robinson and Verdier (2002) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) study a clientelism. Gehlbach et al. (2010)
analyze transition economies, especially Russia, in which platforms are nonbinding while platforms are
completely binding in mature democracies.
13Reinikka and Svensson (2005), Djankov et al. (2003), Cox and McCubbins (1994) and Aldrich (1997)
indicate these points.
11cies converge to xm, and the politicians do not renege on their platforms so often. In an
immature democracy, the divergence of an implemented policy is large, and the politicians
betray the platform severely.
3.3.2 Endogenous Degree of Honesty
This subsection shows that a candidate￿ s degree of honesty is decided endogenously. First, I
show comparative statics of the distance between two candidates￿ideal policies.
Proposition 3 Consider Assumption 1 and 2, and v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. When xR ￿xL
(the distance between the ideal policies) increases, ￿R(zR)￿￿L(zL) (the distance between the
implemented policies) increases, and zR ￿ zL (the distance between the platforms) decreases
in a political equilibrium. If v00(d) = 0 for any d > 0, even though xR ￿ xL changes,
￿R(zR) ￿ ￿L(zL) and zR ￿ zL do not change.
Proof See Appendix A.4.
Assume that v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. As Figure 2 shows, when the candidates￿ideal
policies have more divergence (higher xR ￿ xL), they prefer to implement more extreme
policies (higher ￿R(zR) ￿ ￿L(zL)). However, their platforms are further from their ideal
policies (lower zR ￿ zL). On the other hand, moderate candidates whose ideal policies are
closer to the median policy announce more honest platforms that are closer to their ideal
policies, do not betray them as severely, and implement more moderate policies. Thus, it can
be concluded that more moderate candidates are more honest. The intuition is from the next
corollary. Denote ￿i(zi;zj) = ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿i(zi)j)+v(j￿j(zj)￿xij). If ￿i(zi;zj)
is higher, it means that the utility that the candidate wins becomes higher compared with
the utility when the opposition wins. The candidate wants to win if ￿i(zi;zj) > 0 while the
candidate wants to lose if ￿i(zi;zj) < 0, and the candidate with higher positive ￿i(zi;zj)
has a higher incentive to win, therefore ￿i(zi;zj) is the degree of incentive to win.
Corollary 3 Consider Assumptions 1 and 2 and v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. When candidates
prefer more extreme policies (higher xR ￿ xL), ￿i(zi;zj) is lower when the implemented
policies (￿i(zi) and ￿j(zj)) are ￿xed, but higher when the platforms (zi and zj) are ￿xed.
Proof See Appendix A.5.
First, in order to implement the same policy (that is, the implemented policies are ￿xed),
more extreme candidates will betray the platform more severely, therefore they need to
promise platforms that are much further away from their ideal policies. Thus, they will pay
12a higher cost of betrayal, therefore the degree of the incentive to win becomes lower to avoid
paying such a high cost of betrayal. This is the reason why more extreme candidates will
implement more extreme policies. On the other hand, before an election, if candidates prefer
more extreme policies, they ￿nd it more costly for the opposition to win. Their ideal policies
are then further from the median policy, which means that their ideal policies are also further
from the opposition￿ s implemented policy. Thus, when platforms are ￿xed, more extreme
candidates have more incentive to avoid the opposition winning, therefore the degree of the
incentive to win becomes higher, and this is the reason of why the platforms of more extreme
candidates are further from their ideal policies. If v(:) is linear, an implemented policy will
depend only on the platform. Thus, even though ideal policies change, it will not a⁄ect the
positions of platforms and implemented policies.
From the same reasons as Proposition 3, the following result about the relative importance
of betrayal ￿ can be derived.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and the platform are not the same as the ideal policy,
that is, zi 6= xi in equilibrium. When ￿ (the relative importance of betrayal) increases for
both candidates, ￿R(zR) ￿ ￿L(zL) (the distance between the implemented policies) decreases,
and zR ￿ zL (the distance between the platform) increases in a political equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix A.6.
When ￿ increases, they will implement more moderate policies, but their platforms be-
come closer to their ideal policies. When ￿ is higher, the cost of betrayal is lower as Proposi-
tion 2 shows, therefore they can commit to a more moderate policy with a lower cost. Such
a candidate does not betray the platform so severely, therefore their platforms do not need
to be so far from their ideal policy. In other words, candidates with a higher ￿ announce
a more honest platform that is closer to their ideal policy and do not betray it as severely,
therefore they are rather honest. Therefore, this is another way to derive the candidate￿ s
degree of honesty endogenously. From Propositions 3 and 4, a candidate is rather honest
when they are more moderate (lower xR ￿ xL), and betrayal is important for them (higher
￿).
3.4 Position of the Platforms and a Probabilistic Model
In my model, there is a possibility that platforms are further from the candidate￿ s ideal
policy than the median policy. In other words, platforms may enter the opposition side, i.e.,
zR < xm < zL. This paper allows this situation and does not restrict candidates announcing
13their platforms, but only on their own halves of the policy space. This could happen when
v(j￿j(xm) ￿ xij) ￿ v(j￿i(xm) ￿ xij) > ￿c(jxm ￿ ￿i(xm)j). If this equation holds, the parties
have an incentive to compromise more when their platforms are the same as xm. Note
that implemented policies do not enter the opposition side, i.e., ￿L(zL) ￿ xm ￿ ￿R(zR) in
equilibrium from Lemma 2.
My model assumes that candidates know every decision-relevant fact about the median
voter. If candidates are uncertain about voters￿preferences￿ that is, a probabilistic model
is considered￿ the above situation does not hold in many cases. That candidates have a
greater divergence of policies in a probabilistic model is well known. The following part is
based on Calvert (1985). In a probabilistic model, candidate i announces zi which maximizes
￿i(zi;zj)(￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j)) + (1 ￿ ￿i(zi;zj))(￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij)). Denote
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be an equilibrium, and they prefer to have more divergence.14
Corollary 4 Consider the probabilistic model of Calvert (1985). Then, the pair of platforms
that are a political equilibrium in a deterministic model, z￿
i and z￿
j, is not a political equilib-
rium. In particular, either candidate will prefer to move a short distance toward their ideal
policies.
However, does the platform never enter the opposition side in the real election? The
answer should not be yes. Sometimes, the platforms enter the opposition side. In Japan,
14This corollary shows that z￿
i and z￿
j are not equilibria using the same proof as Calvert (1985). The
existence of equilibrium can be shown in the same way as Theorem 3.3 of Roemer (2001) because my model
satis￿es all the assumptions of this theorem. The only di⁄erence is that when v00(d) = 0 for all d > 0,
xi = zi = ￿i(zi) can be an equilibrium.
14there are two main parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which supports increases
in public works to sustain rural areas, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which
supports economic reform and reduction in government debt. In 2001, the prime minister,
Junichirou Koizumi, a member of the LDP, promised to implement radical economic reforms
that were also suggested by the DPJ, including a reduction of government works and debt.
Thus, Koizumi and the LDP promised the DPJ￿ s policies (Mulgan (2002) pp. 56￿ 57).15
Moreover, in the 2007 Upper House election, the LDP and Prime Minister Shinzou Abe
promised to continue to implement Koizumi￿ s economic reforms while the DPJ promised
some policies to recover and support rural areas.16 This was a complete reversal of the
original stances of the parties. My model can explain both cases in which the platforms
enter or do not enter the opposition side.
4 Asymmetric Candidates
In real elections, the probability of winning may di⁄er from 1=2 when candidates are not
symmetric. The purpose of this section is to predict who will win when candidates are
asymmetric.
However, a political equilibrium may not exist in a deterministic model with a continuous
policy space. Suppose that L wins with certainty, that is, L commits a more moderate policy
than R, j￿L(zL) ￿ xmj < j￿R(zR) ￿ xmj. In this case, at least, L prefers to commit a more
extreme policy such that L still wins against R, and there exists such a policy because the
policy space is continuous.17 On the other hand, if a discrete policy space is introduced,
in the above case, L may not be able to ￿nd such a more extreme policy with the same
probability of winning. Thus, this section supposes that a policy space is discrete.
Suppose a grid of policies, i.e., the policies are evenly spaced. The distance between
sequential policies is ￿ > 0. The other settings are the same as the previous model. Denote
again ￿i(zi;zj) = ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿i(zi)j)+v(j￿j(zj)￿xij). Assume that there exists
￿i(zi) that satis￿es (2). Denote zi(zj) as the platform that commits a slightly more moderate
15Mulgan (2002) also indicates that most platforms are partially achieved, i.e., Koizumi￿ s platforms were
partially binding. For example, his platform about government debt, i.e., a 30 trillion yen ceiling on the
annual issuance of government bonds, was achieved only in 2001 and 2006.
16￿Abe Stumbles on Japan￿ , The Economist, July 30, 2007.
17A mixed strategy cannot be a political equilibrium. First, symmetric mixed-strategies cannot be equi-
libria as I showed in the proof of Proposition 1. Second, asymmetric mixed strategies cannot be equilibria
for the same reasons as the case of asymmetric pure strategies discussed above.
15implemented policy than zj, i.e., zL(zR) satis￿es ￿L(zL(zR)) = xm ￿ (￿R(zR) ￿ xm) + ￿, and
zR(zL) satis￿es ￿R(zR(zL)) = xm +(xm ￿￿R(zR))￿￿. If one candidate, say L, wins against
the opposition R, and R announces zR, then L should announce zL(zR) in order to be
equilibrium. If not, for the same reason as the continuous case, L has an incentive to deviate
to a more extreme policy and still wins against R. Suppose that for any pair of symmetric
implemented policies, that is, jxm ￿ ￿L(zL)j = jxm ￿ ￿R(zR)j, ￿L(zL;zR) is always strictly
higher than ￿R(zL;zR). In words, given any symmetric implemented policies, L always has
a higher degree of incentive to win than R.
The purpose of introducing a discrete policy space is to ensure the existence of equilib-
rium, not show new implications from a discrete case. Thus, assume that ￿ is a very small
value in which the situation is almost the same as for a continuous policy space. The precise
assumption is as follows.
Assumption 3 The distance between the sequential policies, ￿, is su¢ ciently small such
that there exists zR such that ￿R(zL(zR);zR) ￿ 0 and ￿L(zL(zR);zR) > 0 when ￿i(zi;zj) is
always higher than ￿j(zi;zj) for any pair of symmetric implemented policies.
Then, R never wins against L with certainty. Suppose that L announces zL. If R wins
with certainty, it means ￿R(zL;zR(zL)) ￿ 0 because R has an incentive to lose with certainty
if not. If Assumption 3 holds, when ￿R(zL;zR(zL)) ￿ 0, ￿L(zL+￿;zR(zL)) > 0. Thus, L has
an incentive to approach the median policy, and at least tie with R. For almost the same
reason, they never tie in equilibrium. If they tie in equilibrium, it also means ￿R(zL;zR) ￿ 0
where jxm￿zLj = jxm￿zRj, but L has an incentive to win against R with certainty because
￿L(zL + ￿;zR) > 0 when ￿R(zL;zR) ￿ 0 from Assumption 3.
On the other hand, suppose that L wins against R with certainty, and ￿L(zL(zR);zR) > 0
and ￿R(zL(zR);zR) ￿ 0. Then, it is an equilibrium. Candidate R does not have any
incentive to win with certainty or tie, and L does not need to approach the median policy
any more, and if L commits a symmetric implemented policy with R or a more extreme
policy, then the probability of winning decreases, and the expected utility decreases because
￿L(zL(zR);zR) > 0. There exists such an equilibrium if Assumption 3 holds.
Lemma 3 Suppose that for any pair of symmetric implemented policies, ￿i(zi;zj) is always
higher than ￿j(zi;zj), and Assumption 3 holds. Then, i wins with certainty.
Therefore, in order to check who has the advantage in political competition, it is su¢ cient
to compare the values of ￿i(zi;zj). In the following parts, I compare ￿i(zi;zj) to derive
16the advantaged candidate in the three cases of asymmetric candidates.18 In the following
section, I assume Assumption 3 when ￿i(zi;zj) is always higher than ￿j(zi;zj) for any pair
of symmetric implemented policies.
Even though there are some di⁄erences in the method of the proof, the situation is very
similar to Section 3.3. In all cases, a more honest candidate wins against a less honest
candidate. It can be concluded that when candidates are asymmetric, one candidate wins
against the other because this candidate has a higher degree of honesty.
4.1 Asymmetric Ideal Policies
This section assumes that xR ￿ xm 6= xm ￿ xL, i.e., the position is asymmetric. The cost
and disutility functions are the same for both candidates.
Proposition 5 Consider Assumptions 1 and 2, and v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. When
candidate i is more moderate, i.e., jxi ￿ xmj < jxj ￿ xmj, but the candidates are symmetric
in other respects, then Candidate i wins with certainty. Candidate i has a higher expected
utility. When the candidates￿utility function is linear, the result is a tie or candidate i wins
with certainty.
Proof See Appendix A.7.
A more moderate candidate will not betray his/her platform so severely after an election.
It means that a more moderate candidate can commit to a more moderate policy with a lower
cost of betrayal than an extreme candidate. As a result, a more moderate candidate wins.
In addition, a moderate candidate who wins has a higher expected utility in equilibrium.
When the candidates￿utility functions are linear, they tie in most cases. When the candidate
has a linear utility function, the implemented policy is not a⁄ected by the ideal policy, xi,
therefore the situation is the same for both candidates, and they have the same probability
18In my model, one candidate wins with certainty, but the winner may have a probability of winning that
is higher than 1=2 but strictly lower than one in the real world. However, if a probabilistic model with
uncertainty about the median policy is introduced, the probability of winning changes continuously when
the positions of candidates change continuously. Thus, candidates may have a probability of winning that
is not zero, one or 1=2, and an equilibrium can be de￿ned with a continuous policy set. However, there are
many types of probabilistic models, and each may have di⁄erent results (see Roemer (2001)). The purpose
of this paper is to examine some important e⁄ects of the cost of betrayal (partially binding platforms) on
political elections, therefore this paper concentrates on only a deterministic model to exclude the e⁄ects of
probabilistic settings.
17of winning.19 However, if candidates (or at least a moderate candidate) announce their ideal
policy as a platform for the same reasons as Corollary 2, a more moderate candidate wins
with certainty.
4.2 Asymmetric Costs of Betrayal
This section assumes that ￿ is not the same for both candidates. The ideal policies and
disutility functions are symmetric for both candidates.
Proposition 6 Consider Assumption 1. When candidate i has a higher relative importance
of betrayal, i.e., ￿i > ￿j, but the candidates are symmetric in other respects, then Candidate
i wins with certainty. Candidate i has a higher expected utility.
Proof See Appendix A.8.
The intuition is straightforward. From Proposition 2, a higher ￿i means that the candi-
date does not betray severely, therefore the cost of betrayal is lower, and this candidate can
compromise more with a lower cost. As a result, the candidate with the higher ￿i wins.
When do candidates have an asymmetric cost of betrayal? More senior politicians may
have a lower value of ￿. They do not care about the next election or a party￿ s discipline
because they may retire before the next election. Some candidates (or parties) are supported
by a large special interest group or the media. If one candidate has more supporters than
another candidate, the value of ￿ could be asymmetric. When a candidate is supported by a
large group, this candidate does not care about the probability of winning in the next election
because he/she will get a certain percentage of votes from members of the special interest
group.20 When the media supports a candidate, the media does not blame the candidate
even though he/she betrays more severely. As a result, if the candidate is supported by a
larger number of biased media or special interest groups than the opposition, the probability
of wining and expected utility decreases.
The candidate may make decisions that a⁄ect the value of ￿. For example, sometimes
the candidate decides to intervene in the media. If the candidate intervenes in and controls
the media, the cost of betrayal, ￿, decreases, and the candidate can betray easily. It seems
19While the model with complete information shows that a moderate candidate wins, Asako (2009) shows
that an extreme candidate may win in the presence of asymmetric information about the candidate￿ s ideal
policy.
20Figlio (1995) shows that the retirement decision induces political shirking, and Figlio (2000) shows that
some senators in ￿safer￿seats face a lower punishment using the data of US congressional elections. It can
be concluded that candidates who has a safer seat or does not care about the next election has a lower ￿.
18good for the candidate, but candidates usually support freedom of the press even though the
media criticize them. Why? There is another case. In Japan in 2003, the Democratic Party
of Japan began to issue manifestos. In a manifesto, the party records its platform, allowing
voters and the media to compare it with the implemented policy after the election. Before
2003, candidates and parties revealed their platforms in speeches, campaign posters and talks
to the media, but there were no written documents outlining their platforms. Thus, after
2003, it became easier to check whether or not the governing party betrayed its platforms.
For the parties, the publication of a manifesto increases the cost of betrayal, so it seems bad
for the parties. However, other parties also started to issue their manifestos in 2003 (Kanai
(2003)). Why?
One answer is shown in Proposition 6, namely, a higher ￿ results in a higher probability of
winning and higher expected utility. Thus, if the candidate can change ￿, he/she will choose
a value of ￿ that is as high as possible in a political equilibrium. Sometimes, politicians
prefer to use explicit and impressive words, promising, for example, to ￿end welfare as we
know it.￿Such words are easy to remember, and so increase the value of ￿.
After the election, do they prefer to have a higher ￿? The answer is No.
Corollary 5 After the election, the winning candidate prefers to set ￿ to the lowest possible
value.
Proof See Appendix A.9
Therefore, before the election, candidates may support the freedom of the press (higher
￿), but they prefer to interfere with the media (lower ￿) after the election.
4.3 Political Motivations
In previous sections, I assumed that only fully policy-motivated candidates exist. However,
candidates may care about the bene￿ts from holding o¢ ce, and may not care much about
policy. This section analyzes the case in which candidates are not fully policy motivated.
Based on Calvert (1985), suppose that the utility following a win is:
￿￿iv(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) + W,
and the utility when the opposition wins is ￿￿iv(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij). Thus, ￿i(zi;zj) =
￿￿iv(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿i(zi)j)+W +￿iv(j￿j(zj)￿xij). The level of political motivation
is ￿i > 0, and a higher ￿i means a candidate is more policy motivated, and a lower ￿i means
a candidate is the more o¢ ce motivated. The candidate can obtain W as the bene￿t from
19holding o¢ ce when he/she wins. First of all, the following simple corollary holds. Denote
zi(xm) as the promise to commit to implement xm.
Corollary 6 When W is su¢ ciently high, i.e., W > ￿c(jxm ￿ zi(xm)j) for both candidates,
both candidates commit to xm, and the voting result is a tie.
When both candidates commit to the median policy, the disutility from an implemented
policy is same regardless of the winning candidate, but if W is higher than the realized cost
of betrayal for both candidates, they compromise until they reach the median policy. This
corollary is true in both cases, symmetric and asymmetric candidates. As W increases, their
implemented policies approach the median policy. The main proposition for asymmetric
political motivations is as follows.
Proposition 7 Assume Assumption 1. Suppose that candidate i is less policy motivated,
i.e., ￿i < ￿j, but the candidates are symmetric in other respects, and W < ￿c(jxm￿zj(xm)j)
for Candidate j, then candidate i wins with certainty. Candidate i has a higher expected
utility.
Proof See Appendix A.10.
A more policy-motivated candidate will betray the platform more severely, and it induces
a higher cost of betrayal. On the other hand, a less policy-motivated candidate does not
care about policy so much, so such a candidate does not betray the platform so severely,
and can commit a more moderate policy with a lower cost of betrayal. As a result, a less
policy-motivated candidate wins in an election. A more policy-motivated candidate has
a higher incentive to implement a policy that is near to his/her ideal policy. Thus, such
a candidate becomes disingenuous, and a less policy-motivated candidate is more honest.
Consider symmetric candidates.
Proposition 8 Consider Assumption 1 and the platform is not the same as the ideal policy,
that is, zi 6= xi in equilibrium. When ￿ (the level of political motivation) increases for both
candidates, ￿R(zR) ￿ ￿L(zL) (the distance between the implemented policies) increases, and
zR ￿ zL (the distance between the platform) decreases in a political equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix A.11.
204.4 Discussion
This paper only examines the e⁄ects of partially binding platforms (the cost of betrayal)
on political competitions, and shows who wins among asymmetric candidates. However,
other factors a⁄ect political competitions. For example, in the case of asymmetric costs of
betrayal, I showed that less support from the media or special interest groups means a higher
probability of winning. However, the support of these groups may increase the probability
of winning because special interest groups may ensure a certain percentage of votes, and the
media may control public opinion. The model including such a situation may have some
implications for the media and special interest groups in the political-competition model.
In the case of asymmetric political motivations, I showed that a more policy-motivated
candidate has a lower probability of winning. On the other hand, Callander (2007) assumes
that platforms are completely binding, and they can also be a signal of the future e⁄ort level of
candidates. He shows that o¢ ce-motivated candidates are favored in electoral competitions,
but policy-motivated candidates win a signi￿cant fraction of elections because more policy-
motivated candidates will make more e⁄ort. If platforms are interpreted as not only a partial
commitment device but also a signal about something, the result may be di⁄erent to my
analyses. This paper concentrates on investigating the e⁄ects of partially binding platforms,
therefore these points remain for future research.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the e⁄ects of partially binding platforms in elections. Because of the
cost of betrayal, the candidates always have a divergence between implemented policies in
equilibrium. Models with completely binding platforms and nonbinding platforms are two
extreme cases of the model with a partially binding platform. The degree of honesty is
derived endogenously, and being more moderate or less policy motivated means being more
honest. If the candidate￿ s cost of betrayal is higher than the opposition when the degree of
betrayal is the same for both candidates, this candidate is also more honest. Partially binding
platforms also imply that, when candidates have di⁄erent characteristics, one candidate wins
with higher probability. A more moderate or less policy-motivated candidate wins. The
candidate whose cost of betrayal is higher than the opposition when the degree of betrayal
is the same for both candidates wins too. As a result, partially binding platforms can show
more realistic candidates￿positions and the winner in elections compared with the past
models with completely binding or nonbinding platforms.
21One possible area of future research is to endogenous the cost of betrayal. In this paper,
the cost of betrayal just depends on the degree of betrayal, but it may be decided endoge-
nously. For example, one kind of cost of betrayal is a decrease in the probability of winning
in the next election. In order to analyze such reputational costs, a dynamic model with
two or more periods should be analyzed. Second, depending on the economic situation, the
cost of betrayal and/or the ideal policies of candidates or voters change before and after an
election. For example, if an economic depression or a natural disaster occurs after an elec-
tion, voters may allow politicians to betray their platforms such as changing taxes. This is
another important topic to discuss when considering what happens after the election. Third,
models of political competition are applied in many other topics that use models of com-
pletely binding or nonbinding platforms. As this paper shows, partially binding platforms
induce many di⁄erent predictions, therefore applying a model of partially binding platforms
should also be the subject of interesting future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Lemma 2
Suppose ￿L(zL) < xL.
1. When ￿R(zR) < ￿L(zL) < xL, L wins with certainty. When ￿R(zR) = ￿L(zL) < xL,
they tie. When ￿L(zL) < ￿R(zR) = xR, R wins with certainty. In all cases, L deviates
to choose zL = xL = ￿L(zL).
2. When ￿L(zL) < ￿R(zR) < xR, or ￿L(zL) < xR < ￿R(zR) < xm + (xm ￿ ￿L(zL)), then
R wins with certainty. Candidate R deviates to choose zR = xR = ￿R(zR).
3. When ￿L(zL) < xm + (xm ￿ ￿L(zL)) ￿ ￿R(zR), L wins with certainty or 1=2. Both
candidates have an incentive to deviate to choose zi = xi = ￿i(zi).
From the same reasons, if xR < ￿R(zR), it is not a political equilibrium. Next, suppose
xm < ￿L(zL).
1. Suppose ￿R(zR) < xL. Note that xR < xm + (xm ￿ ￿R(zR)).
(a) When ￿L(zL) < xm+(xm￿￿R(zR)), L wins with certainty. Candidate L deviates
to choose zL = xL = ￿L(zL).
22(b) When ￿L(zL) = xm +(xm ￿￿R(zR)), they tie. Both candidates have an incentive
to deviate from the ideal policy, xi = zi = ￿i.
(c) When xm+(xm￿￿R(zR)) < ￿L(zL), R wins with certainty. Candidate R deviates
to choose zR = xR = ￿L(zR).
2. Suppose xL < ￿R(zR) < xm.
(a) When ￿R(zR) < xm￿(￿L(zL)￿xm), L wins with certainty. Candidate L deviates
to choose any platform that is far away from xm and loses because R￿ s policy is
better than his/her own policy.
(b) When ￿R(zR) = xm ￿(￿L(zL)￿xm), they tie. Both candidates have an incentive
to deviate to choose any platform that is far away from xm and loses because the
opposition￿ s policy is better than his/her own policy.
(c) When xL < xm ￿ (￿L(zL) ￿ xm) < ￿R(zR), R wins with certainty. Candidate R
deviates to choose any platform that is far away from xm and loses because L￿ s
policy is better than his/her own policy.
(d) When xm ￿ (￿L(zL) ￿ xm) < xL < ￿R(zR), R wins with certainty. Candidate
R deviates to choose zR = xR = ￿R(zR) because the ideal policy is implemented
with certainty.
3. Suppose xm ￿ ￿R(zR) < ￿L(zL), then R wins with certainty.
(a) When xR ￿ ￿L(zL), R deviates to choose zR = xR = ￿R(zR).
(b) When ￿L(zL) < xR, R deviates to choose any platform that is far away from xm
and loses because L￿ s policy is better than his/her own policy.
4. When xm < ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR), they tie. When xm < ￿L(zL) < ￿R(zR), L wins with
certainty.
(a) When xm < ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR) and xR < ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR), R deviates to choose
zR = xR = ￿R(zR).
(b) When xR = ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR) and xm < ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR), or ￿R(zR) = xR or
xR < ￿R(zR) and xm < ￿L(zL) < ￿R(zR), L deviates to choose zL = xL = ￿L(zL).
(c) When ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR) < xR and xm < ￿L(zL) = ￿R(zR), or ￿R(zR) < xR and
xm < ￿L(zL) < ￿R(zR), L deviates to choose xm ￿ (￿R(zR) ￿ xm).
From the same reasons, if ￿R(zR) < xm, it is not a political equilibrium. ￿
23A.2 Proposition 1
The Su¢ cient Condition
If the pair of platforms satis￿es (3), and it is symmetric, this pair is a political equilibrium. If
no one deviates, the payo⁄for candidate i is 1
2[￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿i(zi)j)￿v(j￿j(zj￿
xi)j)].
If candidate i deviates to any policy that diverges from xm, this candidate is certain to
lose, and the payo⁄ becomes ￿v(j￿j(zj ￿ xi)j). The change in payo⁄ from this deviation is
1
2[￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) + v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij)]. From (3), it is zero, therefore there
is no pro￿table deviation from xm.
If the candidate deviates to a more moderate platform, say z0
i, this candidate is certain
to win, but the utility when the opposition wins becomes higher than the utility when the
candidate wins. Suppose that the candidate deviates from zi to z0











i)￿xij) < ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij), ￿v(j￿i(z0
i)￿xij)￿ 1
2(￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿v(j￿j(zj)￿xij)) <
v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij) ￿ v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij). On the other hand, ￿c(jz0
i ￿ ￿i(z0
i)j) > ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j).
Because ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿i(zi)j) = ￿v(j￿j(zj)￿xij), the change in the payo⁄from
this deviation is negative. Therefore, there is no pro￿table deviation approaching xm. As a
result, if the pair of platforms satis￿es (3) and is symmetric, it is a political equilibrium.
The Necessary Condition
To show the necessity, I use a contradiction, i.e., if this pair does not satisfy (3) or is not
symmetric, it is not a political equilibrium.
First, if the pair of platforms is asymmetric, one candidate loses and the other candi-
date wins. The winning candidate prefers another platform that has a higher utility, i.e.,
approaches their own ideal point, xi, and still wins. The policy space is continuous, therefore
there is such a platform. Thus, the asymmetric position is not a political equilibrium. In
the following parts, I assume that their positions of platforms (and implemented policies)
are symmetric.
Second, if (3) is not satis￿ed, it is not a political equilibrium. If ￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿
￿i(zi)j) < ￿v(j￿j(zj)￿xij) and there is a tie, the candidate has an incentive to deviate to lose.
The candidate can choose any platform that is worse for the median voter and lose. Before
this deviation, the expected utility is 1
2[￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi￿￿i(zi)j)]+1
2[￿v(j￿j(zj)￿xij)].
24After the deviation, it is ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij). Thus, this candidate can increase their utility
by 1
2[￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) + v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij)] from this deviation. Becuase
￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) < ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij), any candidate will deviate.
If ￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) > ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij) and there is a tie, then the
candidate has an incentive to deviate to be certain to win. The candidate can move slightly
to any platform that is better for the median voter and be certain to win. Assume that
the deviation to approach xm is minor. Before this deviation, the utility is 1
2[￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿
xij) ￿ v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j)]. After the deviation, it is slightly lower than
￿v(j￿i(zi)￿xij)￿￿c(jzi ￿￿i(zi)j). This candidate can increase their utility by slightly less
than 1
2[v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij) ￿ v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j)] from this deviation. Because
￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) > ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij) and the policy space is continuous,
then there exists a platform that can increase the candidate￿ s payo⁄, so any candidate has
an incentive to deviate.
Finally, a candidate never chooses a mixed strategy in a political equilibrium. Suppose
that a candidate chooses a mixed strategy. Denote ^ zi as the platform under which the utility
when the candidate wins and the utility when the opposition wins are the same, that is,
￿v(j￿i(^ zi) ￿ xij) ￿ ￿c(j^ zi ￿ ￿i(^ zi)j) = ￿v(j￿j(^ zj) ￿ xij). If this mixed strategy is discrete, a
candidate whose mixed strategy includes a more extreme platform than ^ zi has an incentive to
deviate to approach the median policy slightly because the probability of winning increases
discretely but the cost of betrayal and the disutility increases slightly. If all strategies in a
mixed strategy are more moderate than ^ zi, a candidate deviates to lose. If a mixed strategy is
distributed on a continuous policy space, the probability of winning is zero when a candidate
announces the most extreme platform in his mixed strategy when two candidates￿positions




v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij) ￿ v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) = ￿c(jzi ￿ ￿i(zi)j): (4)
When zi = xi for both candidates, zi = xi = ￿i, therefore the left-hand side of (4) is
v(jxR ￿ xLj). When ￿i = xm for both candidates, the left-hand side is 0. The value of the
left-hand side continuously and strictly decreases to zero as ￿i(zi) and ￿j(zj) approach xm.
When zi = ￿i(zi)(= xi), the cost of betrayal is zero. It is positive, continuous and increases
25as ￿i(zi) approaches xm. There exists a point at which the value of the left-hand side is the
same as the cost of betrayal. Because the left-hand side strictly decreases, and the cost of
betrayal does not decrease as ￿i(zi) approaches xm, it is unique. ￿
A.3 Proposition 2
Fix ￿i(zi), and denote it as ￿ ￿i. Denote zi(￿ ￿i) as the platform that commits to ￿ ￿i, that is
￿ ￿i = ￿i(zi(￿ ￿i)). Di⁄erentiate ￿c(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij) by ￿. Then:




Di⁄erentiate (2) by ￿, then 1 =
v0(j￿ ￿i) ￿ xij)c00(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij)
@zi(￿ ￿i)
@￿





c0(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij)2
v0(j￿ ￿i) ￿ xij)c00(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij)
. Moreover, ￿ =
v0(j￿ ￿i) ￿ xij)
c0(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij)
in equi-
librium from Lemma 1. Substitute them into (5). Then, (5) becomes:
c(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij) ￿
c0(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij)2
c00(jzi(￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ij)
; (6)
and it is negative from Assumption 1.
From Lemma 1, if ￿ goes to in￿nity, j￿i(zi) ￿ zij converges to 0. From (2), ￿c(j￿i(zi) ￿
zij) =
c(j￿i(zi)￿zij)
c0(j￿i(zi)￿zij)v0(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij). From Assumption 1,
c(j￿i(zi)￿zij)
c0(j￿i(zi)￿zij) decreases to zero when
jzi￿￿i(zi)j reaches zero. Because j￿i(zi)￿zij goes to zero as ￿ approaches in￿nity, j￿i(zi)￿xij
also goes to jzi ￿ xij. From Lemma 2, j￿i(zi) ￿ xij does not exceed jxm ￿ xij in equilib-
rium, therefore jzi ￿ xij goes to a certain positive value when ￿ goes to in￿nity. Therefore,
v0(j￿i(zi)￿xij) goes to a certain positive value when v00(j￿i(zi)￿xij) > 0, and it is a constant
positive value when v00(j￿i(zi)￿xij) = 0. As a result, the cost of betrayal, ￿c(:), approaches
zero, then the condition (3) becomes ￿v(j￿i(zi) ￿ xij) = ￿v(j￿j(zj) ￿ xij), and it holds if
and only if ￿i(zi) = ￿j(zj) = xm in equilibrium. ￿
A.4 Proposition 3
Suppose v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. Consider R without loss of generality. In equilibrium, the
utilities when the candidate wins and when the opposition wins must be the same for both
candidates, and platforms should be symmetric from Proposition 1. This means that:
v(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R) = ￿c(￿R ￿ zR(￿R)): (7)
26Denote zR(￿R) = ￿
￿1
R (￿R), which is the platform committing him/her to ￿R. In addition,
xR￿￿L = (xR￿xm)+(￿R￿xm) = xR+￿R￿2xm because the platforms are symmetric. Then,








0(xR￿￿R)). The di⁄erential of


































Suppose Lemma 1. Fix ￿R and di⁄erentiate ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)




v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))





c00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) ￿ (v0(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R))




If (9) is positive, an extreme type will implement a more extreme policy than a moderate






v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
>
0. To prove that (9) is positive, it is su¢ cient to show that the numerator of (9) is positive.
In other words:






Note that, from (7) and Lemma 1:















right-hand side of (10) is higher than the left-hand side of (11). If
v0(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R)
v00(xR ￿ ￿R)
<
v(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R)
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)














v(d) strictly decreases as d increases,
the right-hand side is positive. If xR ￿ ￿L = xR ￿ ￿R, both sides are the same. If xR ￿ ￿L
27increases, the left-hand side decreases. The reason is as follows. Di⁄erentiate the left-hand













when xR ￿ ￿L > xR ￿ ￿R and v00(:) > 0. As a result,
the left-hand side of (10) is lower than the left-hand side of (11), therefore (10) holds. This
result can be derived even if
v0(d)
v(d) does not change as d increases because the left-hand side
of (10) is the same as the left-hand side of (11) in this case. Thus, (9) is positive.
If v00(d) = 0 for all d > 0, (9) is zero because
v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
is zero, and
v0(xR￿￿L)￿v0(xR￿￿R) is also zero. Thus, even though xR￿xL changes, it does not a⁄ect
the position of the implemented policies, ￿i(zi) for i = L;R.
Suppose again that v00(d) > 0 for any d > 0. To determine the e⁄ect on platforms, it is






@xR. From the above, it is:
￿
v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
+
v00(xR￿￿R)c0(￿R￿zR(￿R))
c00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) ￿ (v0(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R))







Assume that v0(xR￿￿L) in the denominator is zero. Then, ￿
v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
+
v00(xR￿￿R)c0(￿R￿zR(￿R))
c00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) ￿ (v0(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R))
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)
= ￿
v0(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R)
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)
< 0.
Even though v0(xR ￿ ￿L) in the denominator is positive, the value is still negative because
the positive part of (12) is still smaller than the negative part. As a result, a more extreme
type promises a more moderate platform.
If v00(d) = 0 for all d > 0, (12) is zero because
v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))




is also zero. Thus, even though xR ￿ xL changes, it does not a⁄ect the position of the
platforms, zi for i = L;R. ￿
A.5 Corollary 3
Consider R without loss of generality. Fix zR and zL. Di⁄erentiate ￿R(zR;zL) = v(xR +
￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R) ￿ ￿c(￿R ￿ zR) by xR. Note that xR ￿ ￿L = (xR ￿ xm) + (￿R ￿






Lemma 1, ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)






28Fix ￿R(zR) and ￿L(zL). Di⁄erentiate v(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R) ￿ ￿c(￿R ￿ zR)
with respect to xR. Then, it is v0(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R) + ￿c(￿R ￿ zR)(
@zR
@xR).
Suppose Lemma 1. Fix ￿R and di⁄erentiate ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)




v0(xR￿￿R)c00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) < 0. Again, ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)
c0(￿R￿zR). Substitute them into the above
equation, then, v0(xR+￿L)￿v0(xR￿￿R)+
v00(xR￿￿R)c0(￿R￿zR)
c00(￿R￿zR) , and it is negative for the same
reason as in the proof of Proposition 3. ￿
A.6 Proposition 4
Consider R without loss of generality. In equilibrium, the utilities when the candidate wins
and when the opposition wins must be the same for both candidates, and platforms should
be symmetric from Proposition 1. This means that:
v(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R) = ￿c(￿R ￿ zR(￿R)): (13)
Denote zR(￿R) = ￿
￿1
R (￿R), which means the platform committing him to ￿R. In addition,
xR ￿ ￿L = (xR ￿ xm) + (￿R ￿ xm) = xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm because the platforms are symmetric.





0(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) + v
0(xR ￿ ￿R)). The di⁄erential of the right-hand side with






























Suppose Lemma 1. Fix ￿R and di⁄erentiate ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)





v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))





c(￿R ￿ zR(￿R)) ￿
c0(￿R￿zR(￿R))2
c00(￿R￿zR(￿R))










v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))











fore, (15) is negative, and it means that when ￿ increases, ￿R(zR) ￿ ￿L(zL) decreases.






@￿ . From the above, it is:
￿
c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))2
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
+
c(￿R ￿ zR(￿R)) ￿
c0(￿R￿zR(￿R))2
c00(￿R￿zR(￿R))






Assume that v0(xR ￿ ￿L) in the denominator is zero. Then, the above equation is positive,
and even though v0(xR￿￿L) in the denominator is positive, the value is still positive because
the positive part is still greater than the negative part. This means that when ￿ increases,
zR ￿ zL increases. ￿
A.7 Proposition 5
Consider R without loss of generality. Fix ￿L and ￿R, and di⁄erentiate v(xR￿￿L)￿v(xR￿
￿R) ￿ ￿c(￿R ￿ zR) by xR. Then, it is v0(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v0(xR ￿ ￿R) + ￿c0(￿R ￿ zR)(
@zR
@xR).
Suppose Lemma 1. Fix ￿R and di⁄erentiate ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)





v0(xR￿￿R)c00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) < 0. Moreover, ￿ =
v0(xR￿￿R)
c0(￿R￿zR) in equilibrium from Lemma 1. Substi-
tute them into the above equation, then v0(xR ￿￿L)￿v0(xR ￿￿R)+
v00(xR￿￿R)c0(￿R￿zR)
c00(￿R￿zR) . It is
negative for the same reason in the proof of Proposition 3. It means that ￿R(zR;zL) is al-
ways lower than ￿L(zR;zL) for any pair of symmetric implemented policies when jxR￿xmj >
jxL ￿ xmj. From Lemma 3, the candidate with lower jxi ￿ xmj wins with certainty.
Consider jxi￿xmj < jxj ￿xmj, then, Candidate i wins with certainty, and, for Candidate
i, ￿R(zR;zL) is positive, that is, ￿v(jxi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) ￿ ￿ic(j￿i(zi) ￿ zij) > ￿v(jxi ￿ ￿ ￿jj) where
￿ ￿j satis￿es jxm ￿ ￿i(zi)j = jxm ￿ ￿ ￿jj. Because jxi ￿ xmj < jxj ￿ xmj, ￿v(jxi ￿ ￿ ￿jj) >
￿v(jxj ￿￿i(zi)j), therefore ￿v(jxi￿￿i(zi)j)￿￿ic(j￿i(zi)￿zij) > ￿v(jxj ￿￿i(zi)j). The left-
hand side is the (expected) utility of Candidate i, and the right-hand side is the (expected)
utility of Candidate j, and Candidate i has higher expected utility.
When the candidates have a linear utility function, v0(xR ￿ ￿L) = v0(xR ￿ ￿R) and
@zR(￿R)
@xR = 0, therefore the change in both sides of the ￿rst-order condition are zero as xR
changes. Thus, regardless of the position of the candidates, they still tie. ￿
A.8 Proposition 6
Consider R without loss of generality. Fix ￿L and ￿R, and assume that ￿L and ￿R are
symmetric. Di⁄erentiate v(xR￿￿L)￿v(xR￿￿R)￿￿Rc(￿R￿zR) with respect to ￿R. Then, it is
￿c(￿R￿zR)+￿Rc0(￿R￿zR)
@zR







v0(xR￿￿R)c00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) < 0. Moreover, ￿R =
v0(xR￿￿R)
c0(￿R￿zR) in equilibrium from
Lemma 1. Substitute them into the above equation, then ￿c(￿R ￿ zR) +
c0(￿R￿zR)2
c00(￿R￿zR). It is
positive from Assumption 1. This means that ￿R(zR;zL) is always higher than ￿L(zR;zL)
for any pair of implemented policies when ￿R > ￿L. From Lemma 3, the candidate with the
lower jxi ￿ xmj wins with certainty.
For candidate i, the utility when candidate i wins is higher than the utility when the
opposition wins, that is ￿v(jxi￿￿i(zi)j)￿￿ic(j￿i(zi)￿zij) > ￿v(jxi￿￿ ￿jj) where ￿ ￿j satis￿es
jxm ￿ ￿i(zi)j = jxm ￿ ￿ ￿jj. Because jxi ￿ xmj = jxj ￿ xmj, ￿v(jxi ￿ ￿ ￿jj) = ￿v(jxj ￿ ￿i(zi)j).
Therefore, ￿v(jxi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) ￿ ￿ic(j￿i(zi) ￿ zij) > ￿v(jxj ￿ ￿ij). The left-hand side is the
(expected) utility of i, and the right-hand side is the (expected) utility of j. ￿
A.9 Corollary 5
Consider R without loss of generality. After the election, the utility of R is ￿v(xR￿￿R(zR))￿
￿c(￿R(zR) ￿ zR). Note that zR is given after the election. The di⁄erential of it with respect






. It is always negative because (v0(xR￿￿R(zR))￿￿c(￿R(zR)￿zR))
is zero from Lemma 1. ￿
A.10 Proposition 7
Suppose W < ￿c(jxm ￿ zi(xm)j) for both candidates. Consider R without loss of generality.
Fix ￿L and ￿R, and assume that ￿L and ￿R are symmetric. Di⁄erentiate ￿Rv(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿
￿Rv(xR ￿ ￿R) ￿ ￿c(￿R ￿ zR) + W with respect to ￿R. Then, it is v(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v(xR ￿
￿R) + ￿c0(￿R ￿ zR)(
@zR
@￿R). Suppose Lemma 1. Fix ￿R and di⁄erentiate ￿ =
￿Rv0(xR￿￿R)
c0(￿R￿zR) with




￿Rc00(￿R￿zR(￿R)) < 0. Moreover, ￿ =
￿Rv0(xR￿￿R)
c0(￿R￿zR) in equilibrium
from Lemma 1. Substitute them into the above equation, then:





From (7) and Lemma 1,















. As a result, (17) is negative. It
means that ￿R(zR;zL) is always lower than ￿L(zR;zL) for any pair of implemented policies
when ￿R > ￿L. From Lemma 3, the candidate with lower ￿i wins with certainty.
Suppose W < ￿c(jxm￿zj(xm)j) for j, but W > ￿c(jxm￿zi(xm)j) for i, i has an incentive
to commit the median policy, therefore it means that i has an incentive to commit to a
31more moderate policy to implement than j. Therefore, i wins with certainty. Note that if
W > ￿c(jxm ￿ zj(xm)j) for j, W > ￿c(jxm ￿ zi(xm)j) for i. From the above,
@zR
@￿R < 0, and
it means that a more policy motivated candidate has a higher cost of betrayal. Thus, when
￿j > ￿i, ￿c(jxm ￿ zj(xm)j) > ￿c(jxm ￿ zi(xm)j).
Consider ￿i < ￿j, then, i wins with certainty, and, for i, ￿R(zR;zL) is positive, that is,
￿￿iv(jxi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) ￿ ￿ic(j￿i(zi) ￿ zij) > ￿￿iv(jxi ￿ ￿ ￿jj) where ￿ ￿j satis￿es jxm ￿ ￿i(zi)j =
jxm ￿ ￿ ￿jj. Because ￿i < ￿j, ￿￿iv(jxi ￿ ￿ ￿jj) > ￿￿jv(jxj ￿ ￿i(zi)j), so ￿￿iv(jxi ￿ ￿i(zi)j) ￿
￿ic(j￿i ￿zij) > ￿￿jv(jxj ￿￿i(zi)j). The left-hand side is the (expected) utility of i, and the
right-hand side is the (expected) utility of j.￿
A.11 Proposition 8
Consider R without loss of generality. In equilibrium, the utilities when the candidate wins
and when the opposition wins must be the same for both candidates, and platforms should
be symmetric from Proposition 1. This means that:
￿v(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ ￿v(xR ￿ ￿R) = ￿c(￿R ￿ zR(￿R)): (18)
Denote zR(￿R) = ￿
￿1
R (￿R), which is the platform committing him to ￿R. In addition,
xR￿￿L = (xR￿xm)+(￿R￿xm) = xR+￿R￿2xm because the platforms are symmetric. Then,
di⁄erentiate both sides of (18) with respect to ￿. The di⁄erential of the left-hand side with


















). Both of these di⁄erentials should be the same. From Lemma 1, ￿ =
￿v0(xR￿￿R)
c0(￿R￿zR(￿R)),
















Suppose Lemma 1. Fix ￿R and di⁄erentiate ￿ =
￿v0(xR￿￿R)










￿(v(xR ￿ ￿L) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R)) +
v0(xR￿￿R)c0(￿R￿zR(￿R))
c00(￿R￿zR(￿R))










v00(xR ￿ ￿R)c0(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
v0(xR ￿ ￿R)c00(￿R ￿ zR(￿R))
> 0,
so the denominator is positive. From (18) and Lemma 1,















As a result, the numerator is positive, and it means that when ￿ increases, ￿R(zR)￿￿L(zL)
increases.











￿(v(xR + ￿R ￿ 2xm) ￿ v(xR ￿ ￿R)) +
v0(xR￿￿R)c0(￿R￿zR(￿R))
c00(￿R￿zR(￿R))







The above equation is always negative, and it means that when ￿ increases, zR￿zL decreases.
￿
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Figure 1: Complete, Non- and Partially Binding Platforms 
In models of completely binding platforms, candidates implement their platform. In models 
of nonbinding platforms, candidates implement their ideal policy. In the model of partially 







Figure 2: Ideal Policies and Endogenous Degree of Honesty 
Suppose that the distance between the ideal policies,  L R x x − , increases. Then, the 
distance between the platforms,  L R z z − , decreases, and the distance between the 
implemented policies,  ) ( ) ( L L R R z z χ χ − , increases. 
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